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Abstract: Toulmin’s logical approach to argumentation affects the purpose and design of his argument 
model. The author argues that, even though the model has proven useful and influential in the rhetorical 
tradition, it misses the most central aspects of persuasive argumentation and the rhetorical role of the 
topics. The author outlines a rhetorical argument model that takes the metaphor of places seriously and 
shows the process of building a persuasive argument guided by different types of topical places.   
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1. Introduction 
It didn’t take long for the rhetoricians to adopt the argument model Stephen E. Toulmin 
presents in The Uses of Argument from 1958. Brockriede and Ehninger’s introductory 
article two years later in Quarterly Journal of Speech paved the way by claiming the 
“superiority of the Toulmin model in describing and testing arguments”. (Brockriede 
and Ehninger, p. 46) The following rhetorical tradition has agreed and incorporated 
Toulmin’s model in theoretical articles and practical textbooks on rhetorical 
argumentation and debate to an extent that makes the author of Rhetoric in the 
European Tradition conclude: “Over the years, The Uses of Argument came to dominate 
the literature on debate and argumentation almost completely.” (Conley, p. 295)  
Why is it that this ostracized logician has become an integrated part of the 
rhetorical canon? What is so appealing about Toulmin’s thoughts on argumentation, in 
general, and his argument model, in particular, to rhetoricians? The answer is simple, 
yet far-reaching. What made him a pariah in the field of logic is what made him 
persuasive among rhetoricians: his practical approach to the field of argumentation.  
Rhetoric understood as an art, a classical techne, is essentially a practical activity 
guided by prescriptive how-to advices and hands-on instructions. (cf. Kennedy, p. 19) 
Not surprisingly, then, a book titled The Uses of Argument would trigger rhetorical 
interest. Brockriede and Ehninger point to this when they claim that Toulmin's structural 
model provides “a practical replacement” to the syllogism that “promises to be of 
greater use in laying out rhetorical arguments for dissection and testing than the 
methods of traditional logic.” (Brockriede and Ehninger, p. 47) Anyone who has taught 
a course on argumentation, persuasive speech or debate knows that the argument model 
presented in The Uses is in fact useful when the students are to analyze and evaluate 
arguments in a public debate or want to critically test their own main argument in a 
speech, text or debate. The model’s diagrammed structure with lines and an arrow 
visualizes different argumentative functions, logical relations and inferential steps far 
better than the linear syllogism. The vocabulary of claim, data and warrant is intuitive, 
and it captures the different logical functions of a practical argument more precisely 
than the syllogistic equivalents minor premise, major premise and conclusion. And 
finally, the three additional elements backing, rebuttal and qualifier grant the 
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uncertainty and opposition of real-life arguments a legitimate and visible place that is 
absent in the simpler syllogistic structure.  
The rebuttal and the qualifier at the same time point to an epistemological 
understanding of the practical that can help explain Toulmin’s appeal to rhetoricians. 
When Toulmin accept probability and field-dependence, he speaks the language of 
rhetoric. His claim that ”Warrants are of different kinds, and may confer different 
degrees of force on the conclusion they justify.” (Toulmin 1958, p. 100) resonates well 
with an academic discipline that has always operated in the practical and probable 
domain of endoxa, dealing with choices and actions and “things that are for the most 
part capable of being other than they are”. (Aristotle Rhetoric, 1357a). Context matters 
to Toulmin as it does to rhetoricians, and his epistemological ambition of expanding 
“the court of reason” is on par with classical rhetorical thinking. (cf. Toulmin 1958, pp. 
40-41) As expressed by the authors of Handbook of Argumentation Theory: “Perhaps 
equally attractive seems to be Toulmin’s view of the context-dependency of the 
standards for assessing argumentation, and his starting point that in establishing the 
relevant criteria the supremacy of one particular field of argument over others must be 
rejected.” (van Eemeren et al., p. 251) The Toulmin model not only makes it easy to 
assess real-life arguments, it captures a world of variety and uncertainty, that made his 
logical colleagues feel uncomfortable, but where rhetoricians feel at home.   
It took a while longer for Toulmin himself to see the rhetorical connection. 
However, in the canonized 1982 lecture “Logic and the Criticism of Argument”, 
the stray logician had realized that there were minds outside the departments of 
philosophy that appreciated him more than the Frege-influenced logicians of that 
time. The connection he saw was the topics: “Only in retrospect it is apparent that 
– even though sleepwalkingly – I had rediscovered the topics of the Topics, which 
were expelled from the agenda of philosophy in the years around 1900.” (Toulmin 
1982, p. 256) This passage has been widely cited among rhetoricians who see it as 
a sign of Toulmin’s association with rhetoric (cf. Conley, p. 295; Gabrielsen, pp. 
60-61; Godden, section 4.; Golden, Berquist and Coleman, p. 251; Jasinski, p. 
206)1 After all, you can’t blame a rhetorician for being pleased about winning one 
over from Plato’s camp of philosophers. 
The question is if the rhetoricians have been too pleased. Has the rhetorical 
tradition been too selective in the reading of Toulmin and too blind in its 
acceptance? The authors of Handbook of Argumentation Theory seem to support 
the idea of a selective reading of Toulmin’s work:  
 
”It is striking that most authors who used Toulmin’s model as a general model for argumentation 
analysis – again, including Brockriede and Ehninger, Trent, and Toulmin himself 20 years later – 
ignore the logical ambitions Toulmin intended his model to serve with regard to the replacement of 
formal validity in the geometrical sense by validity in the Toulminian procedural sense.” (van 
Eemeren et al., p. 239) 
 
 
1 The passage echoes Otto Bird who connected the dots as early as 1961 in his article “The Re-Discovery 
of the Topics”. Bird introduces his article: “This development, particularly in the form it takes in this last 
book, has many similarities with the analysis of the Topics in medieval logic. The resemblance is so 
close, as I hope to show, that it appears we are witnessing something of a re-discovery of the Topics.” (p. 
534). 
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Even though, the Toulmin model has proven useful to rhetoricians, as Brockriede and 
Ehninger suggested and the long line of textbooks on argumentation after them have 
demonstrated, I shall argue that the price of winning a philosopher has been losing 
something essentially rhetoric. The rhetoricians have been all too willing to ignore the 
fact that Toulmin speaks the rhetorical language with a distinct logical dialect and have 
not paid enough attention to the aspects of Toulmin’s approach to practical 
argumentation that differs from a genuinely rhetorical approach. The fact that the 
Toulmin model is more accurate and useful than traditional logic does not make it 
potentially the most accurate and useful structural model of rhetorical argumentation.  
To get an idea of the shortcomings of the Toulmin model seen from a rhetorical 
perspective, I shall outline an alternative rhetorical argument model that more fully 
captures the inventive and persuasive power of the topics. The argument model focuses 
on argument as a persuasive process, not as an inferential product, and shows the 
different strategic topical choices that are involved in building a rhetorical argument. 
Before I get this far, however, I will first take some time to show that Toulmin is 
justified in claiming that he has “rediscovered the topics of the Topics”. But instead of 
seeing that as a sign of him becoming a rhetorician, I shall see it indicative of his logical 
influence on rhetoric.  
 
2. Toulmin’s limited logical approach to the topics  
One can easily see why Toulmin must have enjoyed reading the Topics when he found 
that ancient work of Aristotle that had been expelled from logic. Discontented as he was 
with the rigid universalism of formal logic that “display arguments from different fields 
in a common form” and “by appeal to a single, universal set of criteria applicable in all 
fields of argument alike” (Toulmin 1958, p. 39), he set out to reform what he saw as a 
”corrupt tradition” of philosophy. (Toulmin 1982, p. 254) In opposition to the logic in 
vogue at the time he wrote The Uses of Argument, he was convinced that there are 
“many different ‘logical types’” (p. 13) and “many sorts of assessment and grading” (p. 
34). The reformative project was to make logic applicable to the everyday use of 
arguments by accepting field-dependent standards for critical assessment of ”the variety 
of steps from the data to conclusions which appear in the course of justificatory 
arguments.” (p. 12). He was confident ”that by treating logic as generalized 
jurisprudence and testing our ideas against our actual practice of argument-assessment, 
rather than against a philosopher’s ideal, we shall eventually build up a picture very 
different from the traditional one.” (p. 10). As he realized much later, the picture he was 
building then was in fact a very traditional one. 
In Aristotle’s Topics, Toulmin found a kindred spirit and an abundance of 
inference options. The Topics accounted for all the inferential variation he found in the 
wild but which had been banned from the laboratory of logic. The Topics offered him a 
fine-grained system of around 300 acceptable ways to bridge data and conclusion that 
would accommodate his quest for a functional and flexible logic where different kinds 
of problems call for different kinds of warrants. The structured dialectical setting of the 
Topics with a questioner and a respondent even resembled the courtroom setting he took 
as a paradigm case for the jurisprudence logic he advocated for. As the authors of 
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Handbook of Argumentation Theory put it: “Toulmin seems to construe the 
arguments he is interested in as (dialectical) verbal products resulting from a 
(dialectical) process of argumentative discourse.” (van Eemeren et al., p. 212)  
This is at the same time key to understanding why Toulmin’s project it not 
essentially rhetorical. It is Aristotle’s dialectical approach to the topics that 
appealed to him, not his rhetorical approach. And as we know from Aristotle’s 
own ambitions to make clear divisions of labor between logic, rhetoric and 
dialectic, there is a fundamental difference between rhetoric and dialectic. In 
“Revisiting Aristotle’s Topoi”, Christopher Tindale identifies the difference 
between the dialectical and the rhetorical work of Aristotle: “the goals of the two 
works are quite different, with the Topics suggesting a handbook for procedures to 
succeed in dialectical exchanges or games (likely reflecting the activities of the 
Academy), and the Rhetoric proposing means for persuasion of an audience.” 
(Tindale 2007, p. 1) It is the dialectical understanding of the topics found in the 
Topics that resonated with Toulmin’s reformative logical project, not the topical 
approach found in Aristotle’s Rhetoric or in later works of Cicero and Quintilian 
whom he does not mention.  
This has crucial consequences for the understanding of the topics and eventually 
for the view on argumentation Toulmin brings to the rhetorical division. According to 
Joseph Wenzel’s well-known effort to demarcate logic, dialectic and rhetoric as three 
distinct perspectives on argumentation, “logic seeks to discover or develop canons of 
correct inference that enable us to settle on certain expressions as reliable knowledge. 
(Wenzel, p. 128) Hence, it follows from the starting point in logic that Toulmin’s 
approach to argumentation focuses on critical evaluation. Toulmin’s key interest in The 
Uses of Argument is “the ways in which we set about grading, assessing and criticising” 
arguments (p. 12, cf. also p. 33 and 39). Keywords are ”standards”, ”criteria”, 
“soundness” and “validity” – words that help “to keep in the centre of the picture the 
critical function of the reason.” (p. 8). What Toulmin found in the Topics was exactly 
that – a method to formalize actual arguments in order to critically test the soundness of 
the applied inference.2  
The critical approach to argumentation influences Toulmin’s notion of 
audience. The audience we meet in The Uses of Argument takes on the role of a 
persistent ”challenger” (Toulmin 1958, p. 97). The challenger poses critical 
questions such as “Does it really follow?”, “Is it really a legitimate inference?” (p. 
139), and the recurring: ”How do you get there” (cf. p. 98, 99 and 130) and “What 
have you got to go on?” (cf. p. 97, 98, 99, 140). In other words, the challenger acts 
much like a questioner in a dialectical debate who critically tests the specific 
inference-warrant applied by the speaker. The Toulmian challenger incarnates the 
court of reason, a rational representative of an academic field who is capable of 
judging what are acceptable and unacceptable warrants within that field – may 
that be sport, mathematics, law or aesthetics. This differs from a rhetorical notion 
of an audience that is a far more complex construct composed not only of 
rationality but also of values, interests, emotions, attitudes and habitudes. A 
 
2 The subtitle of the book edited by David Hitchcock and Bart Verheij Arguing on the Toulmin Model is 
in this sense telling: “New Essays in Argument Analysis and Evaluation”.  
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rhetorical audience would therefore be sensitive to both rational and emotional 
influence, logos, ethos and pathos that is. More generally, Toulmin’s sensitivity to 
context is captured in the abstract notion of “field”, which is a less dynamic 
substitute for a rhetorical situation comprised of exigence, audience and 
constraints. (Bitzer, p. 6) Seen from a rhetorical perspective, the notion of field 
lacks complexity and explanatory power when it comes to describing persuasive 
argumentation.    
The logical approach to argumentation has obvious consequences for the purpose 
and design of argument model. As Toulmin says in introducing his model: “How, then, 
should we lay an argument out, if we want to show the sources of its validity? And in 
what sense does the acceptability or unacceptability of arguments depend upon their 
“formal” merits and defects?” (Toulmin 1958, p. 95). The arrow and the location of the 
claim to the right in the model indicate an inferential movement from data towards 
claim supported by the warrant. If we pair this with the fact that Toulmin uses the terms 
“claim” and “conclusion” interchangeably through chapter 3 in The Uses of Argument, 
we get a model that concludes with the claim – which is reminiscent of a PPC structure. 
The vocabulary associated with the warrant also reveals its logical heritage. The warrant 
contains “rules, principles, inference-licenses” (p. 98); it is what “justifies”, 
“legitimates”, “authorizes”, “entitles”, “permits”, “guarantees” the inferential step from 
data to conclusion with a certain inferential “force”. It is within this logical framework 
of evaluating and analyzing existing arguments that the topics of Topics serve as a 
critical tool. A topos in the Toulmian approach is to be understood as an acceptable 
inference within a field placed in the warrant element of the argument model – or what 
would today be referred to as an “argument scheme”. The Toulmin model is essentially 
a logical argument model designed to make visible the logical form and relations in 
order to critically assess the soundness of an argument.3  
Brockriede and Ehninger clearly saw that when they initially emphasized the 
critical potential of the argument model “in laying out rhetorical arguments for 
dissection and testing”. (Brockriede and Ehninger, p. 47) And Tindale, from a more 
retrospective position, confirms the Toulmin model’s logical influence on rhetoric: “His 
general model of “data” leading to a claim, mediated by a “warrant” with a necessary 
“backing,” has been very influential as a new standard of logical thinking, particularly 
among scholars of rhetoric and speech communication.” (Tindale 2004, p. 8)  
This points to an unfulfilled rhetorical and topical potential in the Toulmin model. 
For all the model’s rhetorical usability, there’s something essentially rhetorical about 
the topics that the model does not capture. His starting point in logic blinds him to a 
genuinely rhetorical understanding and practical use of the topics that ultimately would 
lead to a differently designed argument model. 
 
3 Rigotti and Greco shares the dialectical approach to topic in their book Inference in Argumentation. A 
Topics-Based Approach to Argument Schemes where the introduce The Argumentum Model of Topics. 
The model differs radically from the one I will outline later in its purpose and design as it focuses on 
topoi as inferential-logical sources rather than as places to find persuasive arguments. The purpose of 
their model like Toulmin’s is to show and asses inferential moves in an actual argument.  
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First, as a result of Toulmin’s critical approach to argumentation, he doesn’t 
appreciate the creative potential of the topics as a method to find possible persuasive 
arguments. What Toulmin had sleepwalkingly rediscovered was the logical potential of 
the dialectical topics to formalize arguments – not the rhetorical potential to invent 
them. What’s wanting in Toulmin’s approach is the heuristic potential of the topics – or 
what Kienpointner refers to as the function as “search formulas”: “The topoi are search 
formulas which tell you how and where to look for arguments.” (Kienpointner, p. 226) 
In the rhetorical tradition, the topics are an ars inveniendi, a method for systematically 
searching for persuasive arguments. The topics found in the rhetorical tradition present 
the persuader with catalogues of possible places to find argumentative material. Cicero 
vividly stresses this heuristic quality of the topics in De Oratore:  
 
“For, as if I were to point out a Mass of Gold that is buried in several Places, it would be enough if I 
should describe the Signs and Marks of the Places where it lay; for then the Person to whom I thus 
describ’d it, might find and dig it up with Ease and Certainty: Thus, after I had made myself Master of 
these distinguishing Characters of Arguments, they pointed out what I was in Search of, all the rest is to 
be wrought out by Care and Invention.” (Cicero De Oratore, XLI)  
The comparison between topical places and places in the physical world points to 
another aspect of the topics that is missing in the Toulmin model – the actual places. 
Toulmin made room for inferential variation in the warrant, but the model itself does 
not show this variation, topical alternatives that is. What Tindale says about the topical 
tradition in general goes for Toulmin as well: ”Largely suppressed here, though, is the 
alternative richness of the “place” metaphor, some sense of which no account of the 
topoi should avoid.” (Tindale 2007, p. 4) And he concludes the same article with the 
claim that there is “value carried through the metaphor of place essentially attached to 
the concept of a topos; a value threatened if we think only of topoi as argumentation 
schemes.” (Tindale 2007, p. 10) Following Tindale, we must expect a structured 
argument model inspired by the rhetorical topics to take the place metaphor seriously. 
Hence, where the central questions within Toulmin’s logical perception of the topics 
were: “What have you got to go on?” and ”How do you get there”; the central questions 
within a rhetorical perception of the topics would be: Where do you go?; Where do you 
choose to place your argument? 
In the following I will proceed in a more constructive manner to outline an 
argument model that takes rhetoric as its starting point and attempts to capture the 
creative as well as the metaphorical understanding of the topics.  
 
3. Outlining a rhetorical argument model inspired by the rhetorical topics 
A rhetoric-born argument model would have to reflect the most defining characteristics 
of rhetorical argumentation.  
First, rhetorical argumentation has persuasion as its purpose. According to 
Aristotle, rhetoric is the art of “discovering the available means of persuasion”. 
(Aristotle Rhetoric, 1355b) Wenzel clearly supports the persuasive purpose when 
he describes the nature of the rhetorical perspective this way: “when we speak of 
studying “argument” from the rhetorical perspective, we mean that we seek to 
understand certain elements embedded in the process of persuasion. Thus, the 
rhetorical perspective construes “arguing” as a persuasive process.” (Wenzel, p. 
124) Thus, a rhetorical argument model could be expected to serve as a practical 
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tool for someone’s intention to influence beliefs and behaviors – let us choose to call 
that someone “the persuader”.  
Having persuasion as its goal implies that rhetorical argumentation takes someone 
to be persuaded into account. Secondly then, rhetorical argumentation is always directed 
to an audience. Tindale, in building a general rhetorical model of argumentation, points 
to the centrality of the audience and the dialogical nature of rhetoric in what he, inspired 
by Bakhtin, refers to as the fundamental “addressivity” of rhetorical argumentation. 
(Tindale 2004, p. 103) In every new rhetorical situation, the persuader faces the 
challenge of establishing a common ground with the specific audience that will make 
them willing to act as “mediator of change”. (Bitzer, p. 4) In this respect, it is 
noteworthy that a defining feature of the Aristotelian enthymeme is that it consists of 
fewer premises than the syllogism because the audience are supposed to “supply” the 
suppressed premise to complete the argument. And so too, must any rhetorical argument 
model be expected to reflect the fundamental addressivity of rhetorical argumentation 
and indicate the presence of an audience. 
Thirdly, a rhetorical approach to argumentation is concerned with the 
argumentative process. Returning to the two quotes from Aristotle and Wenzel, we will 
see that they’re both concerned with process: According to Wenzel “the rhetorical 
perspective construes “arguing” as a persuasive process” (Wenzel, p. 124, italics mine); 
and according to Aristotle rhetoric is the art of “discovering the available means of 
persuasion”. (Aristotle Rhetoric, 1355b, italics mine). Hence, a rhetorical argument 
model must be designed with the objective to guide the process of building a persuasive 
argument.  
Topical thinking supports all these three defining traits of rhetorical 
argumentation. As we shall see, in the model the rhetorical topics function to prescribe 
the different kind of places the persuader ought to visit when building an argument 
suited to persuade a specific audience.  
So finally, we are ready to see what a rhetorical argument model informed by the 
rhetorical topics might look like:  
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Let us take a closer look at the three main elements in the model – standpoint, common 
ground and proof. What are their argumentative functions? At what point in the 
argument building process do they become relevant? And how do they relate to the 
rhetorical topics?  
At the center of the model we find the persuader’s standpoint. It is what the 
persuader stands on and commits himself to in the practical domain of politics, 
ethics and aesthetics, where things are “capable of being other than they are”. The 
standpoint is what motivates the persuader to initiate the argumentative process, 
and in that sense, the choice and wording of the standpoint marks the initial step 
in building a persuasive argument.  
As indicated in the model, the persuader at this point faces a choice about 
what type of standpoint he will present. Inspired by classical rhetorical stasis 
theory the persuader has four strategic options on where to win a case: He can 
choose a standpoint about the facts of the case, the definition, the evaluation, or 
the action to be taken. (cf. Kienpointner, p. 228-230) The four stasis represent 
four possible “places” where the persuader could “position” himself and find the 
appropriate wording of the standpoint. So, the persuader must ask himself: What 
kind of standpoint will have the most realistic chance of persuading this specific 
audience? This is the first of three strategic topical choices in building a 
persuasive argument.  
 
The next element in the rhetorical argument model is common ground. When the 
standpoint is formulated the next step in the process is to find the substantial foundation 
of the argument. Common ground is a mental meeting place between the persuader and 
the audience. Common ground could be values – as it is said in Handbook of 
Argumentation Theory: ”The values upheld by a given audience can be used as a 
starting point for determining what that audience will and will not accept.” (van 
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Eemeren et al., p. 268) More generally, everything that captures a socially shared 
perspective in relation to a given case and context could form the basis for common 
ground: ideas, ideologies, beliefs, motivations, norms, frames, narratives, theories and 
methods. As the model illustrates, the persuader at this point in the process is again 
faced with a strategic decision – this time about how to substantiate the standpoint in a 
way that resonates with the shared world view, values and visions of the specific 
audience. The goal for the persuader is to strike what the Greeks would refer to as 
kairos, the Romans as aptum, and Bitzer as a fitting response.  
This is not an easy task. Christian Kock makes us aware that there are multiple 
incommensurable dimensions of practical reasoning that must be weighed against each 
other. (Kock 2006) Christopher Tindale expresses the same point within a topical 
framework: “The arguer needs not just to know her own mind, and the topoi resident 
there; but also the mind of her audience and what topoi they are likely to recognize and, 
hence, to be persuaded by the arguments drawn from them.” (Tindale 2007, p. 9) It is in 
this varied landscape of possible topoi that the persuader must ask himself: Where can I 
“meet” my audience? What kind of common ground relation can I build with my 
audience in support of my standpoint? This is perhaps the most critical and difficult 
point in the argument building process.  
Fortunately, the persuader is not left to his own idiosyncratic and limited horizon 
of knowledge, values, beliefs, interests and habitudes in the search for common ground 
with his audience. As with the standpoint, the topics provide him with a practical tool. 
To quote Kienpointner’s elaboration on topoi as “search formulas”:  
 
”The search formulas help to select relevant arguments from the set of ‘endoxa’, that is, the propositional 
content of the arguments has to be taken from the set of propositions which are accepted by all or most 
people and/or by all or most experts.” (Kienpointner 1997, p. 226)  
 
Through the rhetorical tradition we find different topoi catalogues that guide the 
persuader in a systematic search for the “available means of persuasion” in relation to a 
specific subject or genre. Let me give just a few examples to clarify how common 
ground is to be understood within a topical framework. In book 1 of his Rhetoric 
Aristotle presents his “specific topoi” listing commonly accepted taxonomies and 
examples of good and evil, honorable and shameful, just and unjust. These lists provide 
the ancient rhetor with an armory of possible common grounds for epideictic praise and 
blame, forensic accusation and defense, or deliberative advice about future actions. As 
Rigotti and Greco notes: ”In the Rhetoric, the examples that illustrate the list of topoi 
often report fragments of culturally important debates.” (Rigotti and Greco, p. 30) In 
that respect, today’s persuader would probably find most of the Aristotelian catalogues 
of specific topoi insufficient and inadequate in the search for common ground with a 
contemporary audience. Kock, however, makes a case for the usefulness of another list 
of topoi found in Rhetorica ad Alexandrum. Here the unknown author provides the 
young Alexander the Great with an inventory of common ways to argue for an action 
listing eight possible justificatory perspectives: Just, lawful, expedient, honourable, 
pleasant, easy to accomplish, practicable and necessary. (Kock, pp. 254-255) According 
to Kock this list presents “an inventory of the warrants available for practical reasoning” 
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that could serve as a possible expansion of Brockriede and Ehninger’s underdeveloped 
category of motivational arguments. As a final example, I would like to mention a more 
contemporary topoi catalogue that I have developed in collaboration with rhetorician 
Jonas Gabrielsen. The topoi catalogue contains eight topoi that we have observed to be 
the most commonly applied perspectives in political argumentation – and therefore 
would be relevant places to visit in the search for common ground in political speeches: 
Economy, environment, ethics, health, culture, legislation, aesthetics, religion.4 The 
precise nature of the topoi catalogue – how many and what kinds of common grounds it 
contains – is less important in regard to the model. The important point being that it is 
the topics that allow the persuader to navigate with open eyes in the topical landscape of 
possible places to establish common ground with his audience. Or to put it less 
metaphorically: The model shows that there are multiple ways to support the standpoint 
and, hence, encourages the persuader to deliberately weigh the alternatives to make an 
informed choice about where to ground his argument.  
We now see that both the term “common” and “ground” are appropriately 
ambiguous to capture what is going on at this step in the argument building process. 
“Common” takes on the double meaning of the “ordinary, customary, usual, normal, 
habitual” and what is “united, mutual”. Thereby the term sheds light on the Ciceronian 
point that it is much easier to find what the audience has in common if one has a map of 
what is common. “Ground” evokes the topical metaphor of “place”; it points to the 
function as the argument’s base; and it works as a synonym for words native to 
argumentation theory such as reason, justification, rationale, support and premise. 
 
This leads us to the third and final element in the argument model: proof. Where 
standpoint was tied to the persuader and common ground to the audience, the proof is 
tied to the subject matter. Common ground and proof both function as justifications for 
the standpoint, but where the common ground element is abstract and value oriented, 
the proof is concrete and factual. The search for proof is controlled by the common 
ground chosen in the previous step. If one for instance has chosen an economic common 
ground, the proof must be of the economic kind as it is the common ground that makes 
a given type of proof relevant. This on the other hand means that the proof as the final 
step in the process of building an argument has a double support function: It 
substantiates the persuader’s standpoint; and it adds weight to the chosen common 
ground thereby proving that it is a reasonable perspective in the case at hand. At this 
point in the argument building process the persuader is looking for material support in 
the form of for instance examples, analogies, expert statements, results of surveys or 
research, observations, scientific definitions, laws, statistics – everything that could 
function as evidence for both standpoint and common ground. Kock describes the 
content and the role of the proof when he refers to “the topical tools of similarities, 
differences, and paradigmatic examples, as well as the numerous devices of 
'amplification' and 'diminution', with the aid of which we may add to or detract from the 
 
4 This exact list has not been published. But earlier versions have been published in Danish journals 
RetorikMagasinet (Pontoppidan and Gabrielsen, 2009) and Nordicom-Information (Pontoppidan, 
Gabrielsen and Jønch-Clausen, 2010). 
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weight of any given argument.” (Kock, p. 257). A wisely chosen example or analogy 
will at the same time strengthen the credibility of the standpoint and bolster the relation 
between standpoint and common ground.  
As the model shows, the persuader is again faced with a choice as it is 
possible to generate more than one proof in relation to each common ground. And 
once again, the topics found in the rhetorical tradition serve as a useful resource of 
the “available means of persuasion” – only this time the means at hand are not common 
values and perspectives in a specific context, but common types of proof. In Chapter 23 
of Book 2 of his Rhetoric for instance, Aristotle supply the persuader with a catalogue 
of 28 “universal” or “common” topics including for example the more and the less, 
definition, division, induction, analogy, precedent, consequence, cause and 
contradiction.5 Kienpointner mentions the medieval “hexameter of invention”, the seven 
wh-questions: Who, what, where, by what means, why, how, when. (Kienpointner, pp. 
227-228) And Brockriede and Ehninger in their introduction to Toulmin present a list of 
six types of substantive arguments: cause, sign, generalization, parallel case, analogy, 
and classification. (Brockriede and Ehninger, pp. 48-50) Again, this is just to exemplify 
what a heuristic topoi catalogue might contain to secure a thorough and systematic 
search for proof. Whether the persuader chooses to go ad fontes to the classical list of 
Greek topoi or Roman loci or instead chooses to consult contemporary taxonomies of 
argument types is less important to the design of the model. What the model illustrates 
is that there are several places to find proof for a given standpoint within a specific 
perspective.  
This implies a fundamental difference between the logician’s and the rhetorician’s 
understanding and use of the topoi associated with proof. Seen from the logician’s 
product-oriented and critical point of view it is the logical form of the argument that 
each universal topos represents that is of interest. We see that in Aristotle’s Topics and 
the argument scheme tradition that aim for fine-grained theoretical categorization of 
different argument types. Seen from a practical rhetorical point of view, on the other 
hand, the categorization of different argument types is not a goal in and of itself. No 
doubt, it is relevant for the persuader to be familiar with the strengths and weaknesses 
of each of the different general topoi in the catalogue, as it is a way to weigh the 
strength of the different available proofs up against each other. But first and foremost, 
the classification of different types of arguments has a practical heuristic function. The 
body of universal topoi serves as a practical tool to direct a methodical search for 
concrete material that could serve as proof – for instance examples, definitions, 
consequences, causes and contradictions. As Sara Rubinelli expresses it: ”In particular, 
the method of the Topics has general usefulness in that it helps speakers see the multiple 
sides of an issue.” (Rubinelli, p. 146) So, where logic sees the topoi as formal 
placeholders for arguments, rhetoric sees the topics as fruitful places to look for 
arguments.  
 
5 It is noteworthy – and somewhat confusing – that the general topoi are general in the sense that they can 
be applied in every type of case; and the specific topoi are in the sense that different subjects, situations, 
audiences and genres call for specific catalogues. But the result of the search is the opposite: The specific 
topoi result in abstract values and the general topoi result in concrete facts.  
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4. Conclusion  
When Toulmin claimed that he “had rediscovered the topics of the Topics” he was right. 
His ambition to create a substantive logic that accepts a variety of different field-
dependent standards and criteria for connecting data and conclusion is materialized in 
Aristotle’s dialectical work on argumentation listing hundreds of inference-warrants.  
Toulmin’s tight bonds with the dialectical topics, however, are exactly what 
loosens the bonds to rhetoric and a rhetorical use of the topics. It misses the essentially 
rhetorical approach to argumentation as a process of discovering and choosing between 
the available means of persuasion in relation to a specific audience. Where Toulmin’s 
interest lies in the inferential patterns and permissions, rhetoric is interested in the 
persuasive process. Where Toulmin is preoccupied with possible connections between 
data and claim, rhetoric is interested in what could possibly connect the persuader and 
audience. Where Toulmin is preoccupied with common standards and validity, rhetoric 
is preoccupied with how to establish common ground with what an audience values. So, 
while Toulmin’s model has proven useful to rhetoricians, it has also come with an 
unmistakable logical influence. Applying the Toulmin model is applying a view on 
rhetorical argumentation, that focuses on argument evaluation, not on argument 
creation. His logic might be substantive, but it is not inventive.  
This makes room for a rhetorical argument model that more fully captures the 
inventive process of building a persuasive argument with the aid of topical thinking. 
The paper offers such a model.  
Where Toulmin’s logic-born model is designed to assess an argument, the 
outlined rhetoric-born argument model is designed to build it. The model guides the 
persuader through the steps involved in the process of deciding what to argue for 
(standpoint), what to argue on (common ground), and what to argue from (proof). The 
model makes visible, what is hidden from the Toulmin model, namely the series of 
strategic choices involved in the process of formulating a realistic standpoint, 
establishing a relevant common ground, and finding compelling proof. These are 
choices between different topical “places” found in different kinds  of topoi catalogues 
containing types of cases, culturally shared perspectives and types of proof. Seen from a 
rhetorical point of view, the topoi are not something that comes in as a critical tool after 
the argument has been presented, they play an important part in building the argument 
as a practical tool for making systematic choices.  
Seen from a practical rhetorical point of view, then, the rhetorical model precedes 
Toulmin’s model. We must build the argument before we can evaluate it. But that does 
not mean that the outlined rhetorical argument model renders the Toulmin model – or 
any other logical argument model – irrelevant. The Toulmin model will still be a useful 
tool for critical “dissection” and “testing” the arguments that result from the topical 
process guided by the rhetorical argument model – as Brockriede and Ehninger 
suggested.  
Brockriede and Ehninger concluded their introduction to Toulmin’s argument 
model with this hopeful final remark “All this is not meant to be the end, but rather the 
beginning of an inquiry into a new, contemporary, dynamic, and usable logic for 
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argument.” (Brockriede and Ehninger, p. 53) I would like to conclude with the hope that 
the outlined rhetorical argument model can be the beginning of an inquiry into what a 
persuasive and inventive argument model could look like. 
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